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Mapping human rights-based climate litigation in Canada (forthcoming,
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 2021)
by Lisa Benjamin, Assistant Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School (lbenjamin@lclark.edu)
and Sara L Seck, Associate Professor, Yogis and Keddy Chair Human Rights Law, Schulich
School of Law (sara.seck@dal.ca) *
In line with global trends, there has been an increase in human rights-based climate litigation brought in Canadian
courts in recent years. Some litigants invoke human rights as found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms to push federal and provincial governments to take seriously the implementation of their climate obligations.
Other litigants invoke procedural environmental human rights to engage in free speech and peaceful protest in the face of
government action supporting fossil fuel consumption or expansion. At the same time, the Supreme Court of Canada
has recognized that Canadian courts could develop civil remedies for corporate violations of customary international law,
opening the door to future human rights-based corporate climate accountability litigation. Due to the nascent stage of
climate litigation in Canada, this paper maps a broad variety of emerging cases into three interrelated sections: substantive,
procedural and corporate-based litigation. It also highlights emerging and potential future trends, such as the high level
of youth and Indigenous plaintiffs and future corporate litigation. The paper aims to provide a critical overview of emerging
Canadian developments in human rights-based climate litigation brought against the state, and reflects on potential
strategies for future litigation, including against transnational corporate actors.
Keywords: human rights, climate litigation, corporate climate litigation, Canada, Charter of
Rights and Freedoms
1. INTRODUCTION
In line with global trends, there has been an increase in human rights-based climate litigation brought
in Canadian courts in recent years.1 Some cases invoke human rights, such as those found in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 to push federal and provincial governments to take seriously
the implementation of their climate obligations. In other cases, litigants invoke human rights to contest
government action supporting fossil fuel consumption or expansion, or exercise their procedural
environmental human rights, including rights to engage in free speech and peaceful protest. 3 At the
same time, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that Canadian courts could develop civil
* We would like to thank our research assistants Akriti Bhargava, Logan Cook, Charlotte Hobson, Margarita
Mashkovskaya and Katie Walker. Any errors remain those of the authors.
1 See generally the Sabin Center climate change litigation database, http://climatecasechart.com/climate-changelitigation/; J Setzer and C Higham, Global trends in climate change litigation: 2021 snapshot (London: Grantham Research
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London
School of Economics and Political Science, 2021); UN Environment Programme (2020), Global Climate Litigation Report:
2020 Status Review,
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34818/GCLR.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
3 We adopt an expansive definition of procedural environmental human rights following the approach taken in the 2018
Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment. See United Nations General Assembly, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment
(Framework Principles) 24 January 2018, A/HRC/37/59.
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remedies in domestic law for corporate violations of customary international law, opening the door to
future innovative human rights-based climate corporate accountability litigation.4 Our aim in this
paper is twofold: first, to provide a critical overview of recent human rights-based climate litigation
brought in Canadian courts; and second, to offer reflections on potential future directions for human
rights-based climate actions. Our aim is to provide food for thought for legal researchers, as well as
potential litigants and their lawyers in Canada and beyond. Climate litigation is Canada is a new and
emerging field, and therefore concrete recommendations are inappropriate at this early stage.
However, some developing trends and potential future strategies are identified.
In Part 2, we briefly introduce the nature of climate impacts on those living in Canada, including
Indigenous peoples, as well as key Canadian law and policy responses to climate change. In Part 3,
we consider climate litigation against federal and provincial governments that relies on one or both of
the right to life or equality rights provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5 These may be
understood as cases in which litigants are seeking to protect their substantive right to a safe climate
system.6 They are substantive human rights based claims, grounded in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. In Part 4 we turn to cases in which procedural environmental human rights are invoked
to enable climate-concerned citizens to engage in climate action or to protect themselves from
prosecution. We define procedural environmental human rights expansively to include rights to access
information, prior assessment of proposed policies and projects, freedom of association, freedom of
expression and peaceful assembly, public participation in environmental decision-making, and access
to justice and effective remedies.7 Our aim in adopting an expansive definition of procedural rights is
to include rights that are necessary to ensure the creation of a ‘safe and enabling environment’ for
environmental human rights defenders.8 We consider cases to protect such procedural environmental
human rights as part of the Canadian human rights-based climate litigation landscape in recognition
of the fact that the exercise of these rights, especially of free speech and peaceful protest, is essential
for the protection of the environment, including a safe climate system.9 Finally, we briefly consider
the potential for human rights-based climate corporate accountability litigation to emerge in Canada
in light of recent ground-breaking Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on corporate
accountability. A fulsome consideration of human rights-based climate litigation must, in our view,
also contemplate the potential of litigation to invoke the independent responsibility of business
enterprises to respect human rights in accordance with the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles
on business and human rights.10 The business responsibility is equally relevant to environmental
Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya 2020 SCC 5.
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (n2) s.7 and s.15(1).
6 See generally UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean,
healthy and sustainable environment (Safe Climate) 15 July 2019, A/74/161
7 Framework Principles (n3), Principles 5, 7, 8, 9, 10. We also recognize that non-discrimination (Principle 3), attention
to vulnerability (Principle 14) and the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples and rights to free, prior and informed
consent (Principle 15) are cross-cutting concerns.
8 Ibid, Framework Principles 4. See also United Nations General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council
on 21 March 2019: Recognizing the contribution of environmental human rights defenders to the enjoyment of human rights, environmental
protection, and sustainable development (UN EHRDs) 2 April 2019, A/HRC/RES/40/11.
9 Framework Principles, ibid, Principles 1 and 2 and related commentary; Safe Climate (n6).
10 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Key Messages: Human Rights, Climate
Change and Business, <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/materials/KMBusiness.pdf>;
OHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’
Framework (UN Guiding Principles) 2011, A/HRC/17/31.
4
5
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human rights and to climate change,11 and we argue that Canadian jurisprudence has opened the door
to future claims. In conclusion, we seek to identify lessons emerging from the diverse landscape of
nascent human rights-based climate litigation in Canada and offer reflections on potential future
litigation pathways, including how litigation could be used to further underlying issues of Indigenous
self-determination.
2. CANADA AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Canada is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with temperatures currently increasing in much
of the country at twice the global average.12 Climate impacts vary across Canada based on geographic
and historical factors,13 with unique effects felt by Indigenous peoples.14 Climate change is a daily
reality in Northern Canada where there are already average temperature increases above 2°C and
significant impacts on ecosystems, infrastructure, and traditional livelihoods.15 Coastal communities
face storm surges and sea-level rise while floods and thawing permafrost confront other
communities.16 In 2021, wildfires and extreme heat in Western Canada caused devastation national
temperature records were exceeded.17
In response to climate change, adaptation actions are being undertaken in all ten provinces and all
three territories.18 Indigenous peoples are also leading climate adaptation responses across the
country19 while at the same time coordinating Indigenous-led climate justice actions20 and contesting
federal climate policy.21 Notably, Canadian Inuit, together with their Alaskan counterparts, have
actively contributed to the development and recognition of human rights approaches to climate
change, with Inuk Sheila Watt Cloutier driving the Inuit human rights petition to the Inter-American

See Framework Principle 12, (n3) para 35; Safe Climate report (n6) at paras 71-72; and OHCHR Key Messages on
Climate Change and Business, ibid.
12 E Bush and DS Lemmen (eds), Canada’s Changing Climate Report (Government of Canada, 2019)
<https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/Climate-change/pdf/CCCR_FULLREPORT-ENFINAL.pdf> [CCCR 2019]; Government of Canada, Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change in Canada: an update on the
National Adaptation Strategy (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2021) (AICCC 2021),
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-plan/national-adaptationstrategy/report-1.html at 1. See also F Warren and N Lulham, editors (2021) Canada in a Changing Climate: National
Issues Report; Government of Canada, Ottawa, ON
13 CCCR 2019, ibid; Expert Panel on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience Results, Measuring Progress on Adaptation
and Climate Resilience: Recommendations to the Government of Canada (Minister of Environment and Climate Change, 2018)
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/eccc/En4-329-2018-eng.pdf>.
14 ‘Indigenous Climate Hub’ https://indigenousclimatehub.ca/effects-on-indigenous-communities/ ; see also references
to Indigenous peoples in National Issues Report 2021 (n12).
15 AICCC 2021 (n12) at 2.
16 AICCC 2021 (n12) at 2.
17 See ‘World Weather Attribution’, 7 July 2021, https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/western-north-americanextreme-heat-virtually-impossible-without-human-caused-climate-change/
18 See ‘Map of Adaptation Actions’ https://changingclimate.ca/case-studies/#reports
19 See ‘Indigenous Climate Adaptation’ https://indigenousclimatehub.ca ; John Borrows
20 See ‘Indigenous Climate Action: Our Story’ <https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/our-story> accessed 19
August 2021. (‘Indigenous Climate Action (ICA) is an Indigenous-led organization guided by a diverse group of
Indigenous knowledge keepers, water protectors and land defenders from communities and regions across the country.
We believe that Indigenous Peoples’ rights and knowledge systems are critical to developing solutions to the climate
crisis and achieving climate justice.’)
21 https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/amplifying-voices (see decolonising climate policy report)
11
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Commission on Human Rights in 2005.22 While the Commission did not accept the petition at the
time, the petition has been credited with contributing to the now accepted understanding that climate
change threatens the enjoyment of many human rights and is the most pressing human rights issue of
our time.23
Canada is a party to the Paris Agreement, which established long-term goals to limit global temperature
increases to well below 2°C, with an aspirational goal of holding increases in temperatures to 1.5°C
above pre-industrial levels.24 However, the Canadian economy is heavily dependent upon the fossil
fuel industry. Canada is the fifth largest producer of crude oil in the world,25 and has the third largest
oil reserves in the world, most of which are in the Alberta oil sands.26 A number of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) operate in the oil sands and have been implicated in the release of associated
emissions, as evidenced by Richard Heede’s 2013 carbon majors study. 27 For this reason it is important
to consider the possibility of future corporate-based climate litigation in Canada. Canada withdrew
from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, partly because it was unable to meet its targets,28 despite the passage
of legislation in the form of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act.29 Two non-governmental
organisations, Friends of the Earth30 and Turp31 brought litigation to attempt to, respectively, require
Canada to meet its Protocol commitments and prevent Canada’s withdrawal. Both attempts were
unsuccessful, with courts deciding the issue was not appropriate for judicial review.

Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, ‘Petition to the Inter American Commission on
Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused
by Acts and Omissions of the United States’ 7 December 2005 < https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/pressreleases/inuit-petition-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-to-oppose-climate-change-caused-by-the-unitedstates-of-america/> accessed 29 June 2021; S Watt-Cloutier, The Right to Be Cold: One Woman’s Story of Protecting Her
Culture, the Arctic and the Whole Planet (Penguin Group, 2015); S Jodoin, S Snow and A Corobow, ‘Realizing the Right to
be Cold? Framing Processes and Outcomes Associated with the Inuit Petition on Human Rights and Global Warming’
(2020) 54 Law & Soc’y Rev 168.
23 SA Atapattu, ‘Climate Change under Regional Human Rights Systems’ in S Duyck, S Jodoin and Alyssa Johl (eds),
Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Climate Governance (Routledge, 2018) 128-144; Agnieszka Szpak, ‘Arctic
Athabaskan Council’s petition to the Inter-American Commission on human rights and climate change – business as
usual or a breakthrough?’ Climatic Change (2020) 162: 1575 – 1593 (analyzing the human rights-based legal arguments
brought by Indigenous Athabaskans against Canada so that it reduces black carbon emissions or eliminates them).
24 The Paris Agreement (n 7), FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, Article 2(1).
25 Natural Resources Canada, ‘Oil Supply and Demand’ 16 December 2019, <https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/oilsands/18086> accessed 24 June 2021.
26 Natural Resources Canada, ‘Oil Resources’ 16 December 2019, https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/energy-sourcesdistribution/crude-oil/oil-resources/18085 accessed 19 August 2021.
27 R Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers
1854-2010’ (2014) 122 Climatic Change 229. This paper was first published online by Climatic Change in 2013; R Heede,
‘Carbon Majors: Updating Activity Data, Adding Entities, & Calculating Emissions: A Training Manuel’ (Climate
Accountability Institute, Snowmass, Colorado, September 2019).
28 ‘Canada Pulls Out of Kyoto Protocol’(The Guardian, 12 December 2011)
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-pulls-out-kyoto-protocol> accessed 24 June 2021.
See generally C Choquette, D Klaudt and LS Lynes, ‘Climate Change Litigation in Canada’ in F Sindico and MM
Mbengue (eds), Comparative Climate Litigation: Beyond the Usual Suspects (Springer, 2021).
29 Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, SC 2007, c 30. The Act was not supported by the minority Conservative government.
30 Friends of the Earth v Canada 2008 FC 1183, although Chalifour and Earle argue the decision was ‘confounding’ and
very different than a Charter claim: N Chalifour and J Earle, ‘Feeling the Heat: Climate Litigation under the Canadian
Charter’s Rights to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person’ (2018) 42 Vt L Rev 689, 713.
31 Turp v Canada 2012 FC 893.
22
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A recent high profile example of Canadian climate litigation was initiated by Canadian provinces,
including Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Ontario, in an attempt to prevent federal implementation of
carbon pricing legislation.32 As part of its commitments under the Paris Agreement, Canada submitted
a nationally determined contribution in 2017 and has relied on the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean
Growth and Climate Change as its primary regulatory tool to reduce emissions.33 These high-emitting
provinces alleged that the implementation of carbon pricing by the federal government was ultra vires
federal constitutional powers and an impermissible intrusion upon provincial powers.34 While the
issues raised in this case concerned the constitutional division of powers, human rights-based
arguments about climate change appeared in numerous intervenor factums that were supportive of
this legislative action,35 and arguably appeared implicitly in the federal government’s submissions. 36
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held in favour of the federal government, and expressed in
strong language that ‘the effects of climate change have been and will be particularly severe and
devastating in Canada’ with temperature increases of ‘roughly double the global average rate of
increase’ across Canada but closer to ‘three times the global average’ in the Arctic.37 Importantly, the
SCC recognized that climate change ‘has also had a particularly serious effect on Indigenous peoples,
threatening the ability of Indigenous communities in Canada to sustain themselves and maintain their

References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11.
Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change 2017,
˂https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework.html˃ accessed
24 June 2021. The Framework is based on four key pillars, including carbon pricing, complementary measures to reduce
emissions, efforts at adaptation and resilience, as well as accelerating investment in clean technology and innovation.
Canada committed to reducing GHG emissions by 30% against 2005 levels by 2030. See Canada’s 2017 Nationally
Determined Contribution Submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
˂https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Canada%20First/Canada%20First%20NDCRevised%20submission%202017-05-11.pdf˃.
34 See Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 2019 ONCA 544; Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 2019
SKCA 40. N Chalifour, ‘Jurisdictional Wrangling over Climate Policy in the Canadian Federation: Key Issues in the
Provincial Constitutional Challenges to Parliament’s Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act’ (2019) 50(2) Ottawa L Rev,
SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346795>.
35 See for example Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 2019 SKCA 40 (n 26) (Factum of Climate Justice
Saskatoon) <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38663/FM050_Interverner_Climate-JusticeSaskatoon-et-al.pdf>, paras 3, 16, 20, and 30; (Factum of Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation) <https://www.scccsc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38663/FM080_Intervener_Athabasca-Chipewyan-First-Nation.pdf>, paras 3,
7, 12, 24, arguing in part that the GGPPA is not only intra vires but constitutionally imperative to avoid violations of s 35
Aboriginal and treaty rights; (Factum of Amnesty International Canada) <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocumentsDocumentsWeb/38663/FM130_Intervener_Amnesty-International-Canada.pdf>, paras 5-13; (Factum of the
Intergenerational Climate Coalition) <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocumentsDocumentsWeb/38663/FM160_Intervener_Intergenerational-Climate-Coalition.pdf>, paras 1, 7, 22; (Factum of the
National Association of Women and the Law and Friends of the Earth) <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocumentsDocumentsWeb/38663/FM210_Intervener_National-Association-of-Women-and-the-Law-and-Friends-of-theEarth.pdf>, paras 1, 4; (Factum of the Assembly of First Nations) <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocumentsDocumentsWeb/38663/FM220_Intervener_Assembly-of-First-Nations.pdf>, paras 4, 9.
36 ibid (Factum of the Attorney General of Canada) <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocumentsDocumentsWeb/38663/FM015_Respondent_Attorney-General-of-Canada.pdf>. See for example the description of
climate change as an ‘existential threat’ (para 3); that is ‘happening now and is having real consequences on people’s lives
throughout Canada, and globally’ (para 9); ‘The decisions we make today are critical to ensuring a safe and sustainable
world for everyone, now and in the future’ (para 9); ‘Indigenous Peoples are among the most vulnerable to climate
change’ (para 13); ‘GHG emissions create a risk of harm to human health and the environment upon which life depends’
(paras 15, 80).
37 References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11 at paras 9-11.
32
33
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traditional ways of life’.38 Yet neither ‘human rights’ nor ‘climate justice’ ultimately appear in the text
of the SCC decision, which is based on a detailed analysis of division of powers doctrine.
Overall, Canadian legislative approaches to climate change have been inadequate to meet the climate
crisis, and Canada’s track record on meeting its international climate commitments is historically very
poor. Despite favourable talk about climate action by the current federal government, including new
legislative action notably in the 2021 Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act,39 Canada
continues to miss its greenhouse gas (GHG) targets. The country’s updated 2021 nationally
determined contribution (NDC) does not represent a fair share of global emissions reductions.40
Canada’s 2021 NDC points to climate action taken not only at the federal level, but also actions taken
or under consideration by all provinces and territories,41 and actions (more closely relating to
adaptation) contemplated by Indigenous peoples including First Nations, Inuit and Métis.42 As we
note below, Indigenous communities have been active in pushing the Government to implement more
ambitious climate action.
An important consideration in the Canadian context is reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and
truth-telling about Canadian history.43 Among the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)’s Calls
to Action are recommendations that Canadian federal, provincial, and municipal governments fully
adopt and implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP)44 as a framework for reconciliation.45 The TRC also asked the corporate sector to adopt
UNDRIP as a framework for reconciliation, and to seek to obtain Indigenous peoples’ free, prior and
informed consent (FPIC) before proceeding with economic development projects involving
Indigenous lands and resources.46 As will be seen in Part 3, individual Indigenous persons may choose
to appear as plaintiffs in climate litigation together with non-Indigenous individual litigants, relying
upon Charter rights. However, Indigenous nations may alternately choose to bring an action as a
collective, relying upon s 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, which recognizes and affirms the pre-existing
rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, including Inuit, First Nations, and Métis.47 However, while
References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11 at para 12.
Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act, SC 2021, c 22 (assented to 2021-06-29) <https://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2021_22/>.
40 See Canada, ‘Climate Action Tracker’ <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/canada/>. [updated July 2021 to
account for Canada’s updated NDC submission <https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-updatetracker/canada/> See Canada’s 2021 Updated Nationally Determined Contribution Under the Paris Agreement
<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Canada%20First/Canada%27s%20Enhanced%20N
DC%20Submission%20EN.pdf>
41 2021 NDC, ibid, Annex 2
42 2021 NDC, ibid, Annex 3 Indigenous Climate Action. However, these are focused more on adaptation than emissions
reductions.
43 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the truth, reconciling for the future: summary of the final report of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015), <www.trc.ca>.
44 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution adopted by the General Assembly,
2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295.
45 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (n58) at Calls to Action #43-44.
46 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (n58) at Calls to Action #92.
47 Rights of Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, Part II of the Constitution Act 1982 (n2).
s35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) ‘treaty rights’ includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements
or may be so acquired.
38
39
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litigation brought by Indigenous peoples challenging fossil fuel projects including pipelines, as well as
green energy hydro projects, are a tremendously important part in the Canadian landscape of energy
disputes, most of these cases do not appear in climate litigation databases.48 This may be because the
focus of these claims is respect for Indigenous rights rather than climate change, and because the cases
concerning hydro dams may be classified as energy cases rather than climate mitigation cases.49 For
the purpose of this paper, cases found in the dominant climate litigation databases will be the
predominant focus of analysis in Part 3 and Part 4. Nevertheless, this context will inform the analysis
throughout, including the potential of human rights-based corporate climate litigation in Part 5, and
the conclusions in Part 6.
3. SUBSTANTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS ARGUMENTS IN CLIMATE LITIGATION
Climate litigation can be designed to address a variety of climate challenges.50 In particular, climate
litigation has been used for several years to motivate or challenge regulatory action on climate change.51
Climate litigation can also be a way for particularly vulnerable communities to make their voices heard,
and can be a route to enable their participation in policy decisions around climate change, even if their
legal claims are not ultimately successful.52 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has shown that Indigenous communities, along with coastal communities and those dependent on
subsistence agriculture and fisheries, face disproportionate and escalating risks from climate change.53
For certain Indigenous groups, the impacts of climate change involve loss and damage to their health
and lands but also displacement and non-tangible losses such as impacts on cultural values, traditions,
identity and loss of a sense of place.54 Vulnerable groups can make rights-based claims to raise
awareness of or seek to mitigate such impacts, particularly where the group are or will be
disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change. In Canada, these vulnerable groups are
likely to include Indigenous communities, as described in Part 1 above. Claims made by vulnerable
groups have been couched in substantive human rights language, rather than in terms of a specific
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are
guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
48 Compare Sabin (http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/non-us-jurisdiction/canada/) and Grantham
Institute (https://climate-laws.org/litigation_cases?geography%5B%5D=32) climate litigation databases; with energy
disputes involving free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples profiled on Yellowhead Institute
(https://yellowheadinstitute.org/) .
49Grantham 2021 snapshot (n1) at 15.
50 See Sabin Center for Climate Change, ‘Climate Litigation Databases’ <http://climatecasechart.com> accessed 24 June
2021.
51 D Markell and JB Ruhl, ‘An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or
Business as Usual?’ (2012) 64(1) Florida Law Review 15, originally defined climate litigation as any piece of federal, state,
tribal or local administrative or judicial litigation in which party filings or tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise an
issue of fact or law regarding the substance or policy of climate change causes or impacts; H Osfosky and J Peel, Climate
Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy (Cambridge University Press, 2015), define it as cases which have the
issue of climate change at their core.
52 For example, the plaintiffs in the Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d and remanded,
No.18-36082 (case failed on standing, but despite this outcome settlement negotiations have been ordered on 13 th May
2021, <https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/ygdvzobmapw/environment-climate-juliana-settlementMINUTES.pdf)>. See also, L Benjamin, ‘The responsibilities of corporations: new directions in environmental litigation’
in Veerle Heyvaert and Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli Research Handbook on Transnational Environmental Law (Edward Elgar
2020).
53 IPCC, ‘1.5°C Special Report – Summary for Policymakers’ (6 October 2018) ˂https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/,˃ 11.
54 A Thomas and L Benjamin, ‘Non-economic loss and damage: lessons from displacement in the Caribbean’ (2020) 20
Climate Policy 715.
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right to a healthy environment. For example, in Canada climate litigation has relied on rights to life or
to equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with varying levels of success.
Section 7 of the Charter provides that every Canadian has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person.55 Section 15(1) provides that every individual has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination, with enumerated categories of discrimination namely
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.56 For most of its history, the Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted both Sections 7 and
15 using broad principles of rationality and proportionality.57 In addition, its judicial interpretations
have approached Charter claims grounded in human rights claims with significant caution and
deference to legislators.58
Canadian courts have traditionally provided a high degree of deference to legislative and executive
branches of the government in the environmental context, especially in Charter-based rights claims.59
Courts have traditionally deferred to legislators, particularly around Section 7 and 15 claims involving
social and economic rights, in a way that has diminished the potential of these provisions to provide
redress to litigants.60 For example, in the Friends of the Earth and Turp cases discussed in Part 1 above
about the failure by Canada to meet its Kyoto Protocol targets, it was evident that there was judicial
reluctance to engage with the issue of climate change on the basis that it relates to domestic legislation
and policy making. This judicial trend reappears in the cases discussed in Part 3. As many of these
cases are in the procedural stages, it remains to be seen whether this reluctance will continue in the
face of human rights-based climate claims grounded in Charter claims in the future.61 The Canadian
cases addressing climate change and human rights discussed in more detail in Part 3 are summarized
in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Summary of substantive human rights cases
Case name:

Plaintiffs:

Defenda
nt:

Claim:

Defendant
action:

Outcome:

Charter (n 1).
ibid.
57 D Beatty, ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights: Lessons and Laments’ (1997) 60(4) Modern Law Review 484.
58 ibid 481.
59 K Lantz, ‘The Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation: Lessons for Using International Human Rights Law in Canada to
Address Climate Change’ (2020) 41 WRLSI 145, 162.
60 ibid 493.
61 C Feasby, D deVlieger and M Huys, ‘Climate Change and the Right to a Healthy Environment in the Canadian Courts’
(2020) 58 Alberta L Rev 213, 226–8, arguing that Canada does not have an equivalent political doctrine question to the
US, but courts instead rely on general principles of justiciability.
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ENvironment
JEUnesse v
Attorney
General of
Canada [July
11, 2019.
Superior
Court,
Quebec]

On behalf
of all
Quebec
residents
35 and
under
(youth
based
plaintiffs)

Canada

Challenging national
inaction on climate
change:
- Constitutional life,
liberty, security
infringement of
youngest generation
(violates class
member provincial
and Canadian
charter rights).
- Violates right to
Equality pursuant to
Section 15 of the
Canadian Charter.
- Violation of
Quebec Charter
right to a healthful
environment in
which biodiversity is
preserved.

Class action
not
appropriate
procedural
vehicle for
declaratory
relief:
- Nonjusticiablepolitical
question/
Respondent
cannot stop
alleged abuse.
- Provincial
charter does
not apply to
CA
government.

Plaintiff’s claims
dismissed:
- Plaintiff does not
provide a
factual/rational
basis for the
members of the
class.
- If potential nonjusticiability issue
and charter right
violation alleged
then at this stage
case should not be
dismissed as a
result of potential
justiciability issues.
- Quebec Charter
applies to federal
government where
crown is liable for
damages.

La Rose v
Canada and
the Attorney
General of
Canada
[January 02,
2020.
Federal
Court,
Ontario]

15 children Canada
and youth
from
across
Canada
(Indigenou
s and
youth
based
Plaintiffs)

National inaction
led to GHG level
incompatible with
stable climate
system:
- Violation of
sections 7 and 15
under the Canadian
Charter.
- Failure to
discharge public
trust obligations
pursuant to the
public trust doctrine.
- GHG targets
inconsistent with
best available
science.

Motion to
Strike:
- Nonjusticiable.
- Discloses
no reasonable
cause of
action.

Plaintiff’s claim
dismissed:
- Non-justiciable
- No reasonable
cause of action;
claims are
overbroad,
political, and
challenge public
policy approach.
- Only
laws/actions
resulting in
infringement of
rights are subject
to review under the
Charter.
- Public trust
doctrine is a
justiciable, legal
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question that
courts can resolve
with no policy or
political context
but did not
disclose reasonable
cause of action.
Mathur v
Ontario
[November
12, 2020.
Superior
Court,
Ontario]

Minors
and youth
(12-24)
(Youth
based
Plaintiffs)

Ontario

Challenging
Ontario’s
cancellation of the
Climate Change Act
and Preserving and
Protecting our
Environment for
Future Generations:
A in the Made in
Ontario
Environment Plan:
- Violation of
sections 7 and 15
under the Charter.
- Violation of
unwritten principle
that government is
prohibited from
engaging in conduct
that would
reasonably be
expected to result in
a significant number
of harm or suffering
to its citizens.

Seeking
dismissal:
- Nonjusticiable.
- Unprovable
speculations
about future
climate
consequences
of target.
- No positive
constitutional
obligations to
prevent
climate
change
associated
harms.
- No standing
on behalf of
future
generations.
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Defendant’s Rule
12 motion
dismissed; case will
proceed:
- The plan is
reviewable by the
court for Charter
compliance
because the target
and plan are quasilegislative or soft
law that has the
force or effect of
law since mandated
by statute = more
than just guidance
document.
- Plaintiff's claims
are deemed to have
been proven
because scientific
evidence can be
used to establish
harm.
- Justiciable. Issue
is whether policy
violates Charter
rights. Even if
secondary political
questions, Charter
claims hold special
status and
therefore are
justiciable where
claim identifies
specific

government
conduct/law that
violates rights.

Lho’imggin v
Canada
[November
16, 2020.
Federal
Court
Ontario]

Lho’imggi Canada
n and all
members
of the
Misdzi
Yikh and
Smogilhgi
m and all
members
of the Sa
Yikh of
the
Wet'suwet'
en Nation
(Indigenou
s and
youth
based
Plaintiffs)

National GHG
policy objectives
insufficient
therefore:
- Charter of Rights
and Freedoms
sections 7 and 15
Violations - by
failing to establish
national laws and
policies to meet
Paris Agreement
commitments.
- Violation of
Section 91 of the
Constitution Act
under POGG
powers by not
ensuring low GHG
emissions.
- Violation of
common law

Motion to
Strike:
- Nonjusticiable.
- Discloses
no reasonable
cause of
action.
- Remedies
not legally
obtainable.
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Plaintiff’s claim
dismissed:
- Matter is nonjusticiable. The
issue is a political
one.
-Remedies sought
would be
inappropriate for
the court.

principles of Public
Trust.

In Canada, youth-led climate-related litigation was first initiated in 2018 by the Quebec NGO
ENvironment JEUnesse. The NGO alleged that the government’s failure to take climate mitigation
action infringed upon the rights of the youth plaintiffs (being all residents of Quebec 35 years of age
and under as of 26 November 2018) that are protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.62 The NGO characterized Canada’s behavior as
‘grossly inadequate,’ constituting ‘bad faith’ and ‘intentional interference’ with fundamental rights, due
to the state’s inability to meet its Kyoto Protocol and 2020 climate mitigation targets. In addition, the
NGO claimed that Canada’s emissions were disproportionately high compared with its population
size. ENvironment JEUnesse alleged that this behavior constitutes an intentional violation of Quebec
civil law under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.63 It sought orders against the state to cease its
infringements on the group members’ fundamental rights, an order to pay $100 per member in
punitive damages towards the implementation of remedial measures, and any other appropriate relief
to ensure Canada’s compliance with the fundamental rights of the group members.64
In response, the Government of Canada argued that the claim was not justiciable, as the orders sought
would interfere with the other branches of government, and because the environment is a ‘shared
competency’ that the federal government cannot remedy on its own. The Government also contended
the applicable class action criteria were not met. The court agreed with the Government and dismissed
on this last point. The Court also emphasized the urgent environmental challenge posed by climate
change and took a broad interpretation of Charter rights, finding that the violations claimed were
justiciable. However, it found the class description of all Quebecers aged 35 or younger was arbitrary,
and therefore inappropriate, because it excluded, without reason, millions of Quebecers older than 35
who have or will experience the same violations of fundamental rights.65 The court decided that a class
The NGO claimed rights to life, liberty and security and claimed that the right to equality and to a healthy
environment are being infringed: Environnement Jeunesse c Procuereur Général du Canada 2019 QCCS 2885. This decision is
under appeal. See Environnement Jeunesse website, <https://enjeu.qc.ca/justice-eng/> ; M Killoran, C Feasby and MM
Huys, ‘Climate Change Litigation Arrives in Canada’ Osler, 5 February 2019,
<https://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2019/climate-change-litigation-arrives-in-canada>.
63 Environnement Jeunesse ibid [13], citing The Constitution Act, 1982, c 11 in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 44, Schedule B, The
Constitution Act, 1982, Part I.
64 ibid [3].
65 ibid [116–122].
62
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action was not the procedurally correct legal avenue to bring such a climate cases as it would be
impossible for it to identify any group that would reconcile fairness and effectiveness objectively.66
However, this decision is under appeal, and it has been argued that the decision is inconsistent with
an earlier similar class action brought against Volkswagen.67 In that case, Volkswagen was sued for
falsifying emissions test results and a punitive damages class action claim was allowed to proceed.68
A second case, La Rose, initiated in British Columbia (BC) courts in 2019 was brought by 15 child
plaintiffs from across the country (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous).69 The plaintiffs again alleged
violations of Charter rights as well as the violation of the public trust doctrine (including by jeopardizing
future rights to use resources such as the atmosphere, permafrost, navigable waters, foreshores and
territorial sea) by the federal government.70 Children and youth plaintiffs in the La Rose case grounded
their claims in a failure by the Canadian Government to protect natural resources that are imperative
for sustaining human life, by allowing GHGs to continue polluting the environment.71 The plaintiffs
claimed that Canada created a level of GHG emissions that is ‘incompatible’ with a stable climate
system; failed to meet its own (largely inadequate) national GHG emission targets; and actively
participated in and enabled the development, expansion, and operation of industries and activities
involving fossil fuels that contribute to the nation’s GHG levels.72 The plaintiffs each alleged injuries
particular to their age, including negative impacts on their physical, mental and social health, their
cultural heritage, and hopes and aspirations for the future. The plaintiffs did not seek monetary
damages, but instead requested declarations from the Court of the illegality of the Government’s
‘impugned conduct,’73 and an order requiring the government to develop and implement a Climate
Recovery Plan that is consistent with Canada’s fair share of the global carbon budget.74
The Federal Court accepted the Government’s motion to strike out the case in October 2020 on the
basis that the section 7 and 15 Charter claims were not justiciable.75 The court found that climate
change required a holistic policy response, and therefore the claims were not justiciable as breaches of
section 7 and 15, as any such determination touched upon political and economic questions that were
unsuited to adjudication. On doing so the court took a traditional and deferential approach to the
court’s role in adjudicating Charter rights. The court held that issues such as climate change could not
be resolved through the application of law alone.76 The court was not persuaded by the earlier decision
ibid [140].
Association québécoise de lutte contre la pollution atmosphérique v. Volkswagen Group Canada, 2018 QCCS 174
(2018) QCCS 174.
68 L Parker, ‘The Disconnected Arrival of Climate Change Class Actions in Quebec: A Case Comment on
ENvironnement JEUnesse v. Attorney General of Canada, 2019 QCCS 2885 and Association québécoise de lutte contre
la pollution atmosphérique v. Volkswagen Group Canada, 2018 QCCS 174’ (2020) 17(1) McGill Journal of Sustainable
Development Law 100. The Supreme Court of Canada has dismissed the appeal of the class action certification in
Volkswagen. Volkswagen Group Canada Inc. v Association québécoise de lutte contre la pollution atmosphérique 2019 SCC 53.
69 La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen 2019 FCC, Court File No T-1750-19 (Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff)
<http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/la-rose-v-her-majesty-the-queen/>.
70 Ibid.
71 La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen 2019 FCC, Court File No T-1750-19 (Statement of Claim of the Defendants) (paras 7–
9) <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-casedocuments/2020/20200207_T-1750-19_reply.pdf>.
72 ibid [5].
73 ibid [5].
74 ibid [9–10] .
75 La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen 2020 FC 1008.
76 ibid [35–40].
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in Environnement Jeunesse, which held that climate-related claims were justiciable under the Charter,
stating simply that it was not bound by the earlier decision, and the breadth of conduct claimed in the
present case was broader than that claimed by Environnement Jeunesse.77 The court did however rule that
the public trust doctrine was justiciable. In relation to the public trust issue, it found there was clearly
a legal problem that the courts could resolve. However, the public trust claim was also dismissed, as
the court ruled the claim had no reasonable prospects of success.78 The plaintiffs have since appealed.79
In a third case, Mathur,80 seven young Canadian citizens, three of whom working specifically on
Indigenous-led responses to climate impacts, sued the province of Ontario for government actions
that allegedly violated the Charter. Unlike the La Rose case, here the plaintiffs did not focus on the
public trust doctrine. Instead, they focused on Canada’s international climate commitments under the
Paris Agreement, as laid out in the province’s GHG target to reduce of 30% by 2030, from 2005 levels,
articulated in its Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.81 The Cancellation Act, which is at the heart of this
case, effectively reduced the GHG reduction target Ontario would have been subject to.82 The
plaintiffs pointed out that, per the Paris Agreement, state parties should progressively strengthen their
emission targets over time—not weaken them.83 This approach is similar to the strategy used in the
Urgenda case in The Netherlands,84 where parties focused both on human rights issues as well as the
obligations of the Dutch state under the Paris Agreement. Unlike in The Netherlands, international
treaty law is not directly binding in Canada, and so claims based on the Paris Agreement may not be as
successful in Canada. The government’s motion to dismiss was denied allowing this case to proceed.
A fourth case of human rights-based climate litigation takes a different approach. Brought not by
youth plaintiffs, but rather by Indigenous communities, Dini Ze’(Lho’imggin), on behalf of two
houses of the Wet’suwet’en, filed a legal challenge on 10 February 2020 against the Canadian
Government.85 Lho’imggin alleged that the Canadian Government’s targets for the reduction of GHG
emissions by 2030 were insufficient, and as a result Canada violated the communities’ constitutional
and human rights under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.86 The claim is innovative as it foreground
issues of climate justice for Indigenous communities and points to how the continuing impacts of
racism, colonialism and discriminatory domestic policies in Canada contribute to the vulnerability of
these communities.
Poverty and disadvantage are likely to increase in vulnerable populations as global warming increases.87
Therefore claims by communities such as these are likely to increase in the future. Lho’imggin also
ibid [47].
ibid [58].
79 La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen, Court File No T-1750-19 (Notice of Appeal) http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climatechange-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2020/20201124_T-1750-19_appeal.pdf.
80 Mathur, et al. v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario 2020 ONSC 6918, CV-19-00631627 (ON SC) (Reason for
Decision).
81 ibid [7].
77
78

82

Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, S.O. 2018, c 13 https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/18c13.
Mathur (n 80) [37–40].
84 Urgenda Foundation v State of The Netherlands 2019 Case No 19/00135, Supreme Court.
85 Lho’immggin et al. v The Queen [2020] FC 1059 (Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff)
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-casedocuments/2020/20200210_NA_complaint.pdf [2, 27].
86 Lho’immggin et al. v The Queen, [2020] FC 1059 (Decision [4].
87 IPCC (n 49), 8.
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claimed that Canada violated section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by repeatedly failing to make laws
under the statute’s peace, order and good government power,88 necessary to meet its commitments
under the Paris Agreement,89 and that these failures were contrary to the common law principles of
public trust.90 The plaintiffs sought a mixture of declaratory, mandatory and supervisory orders. They
sought a declaration that existing statutory provisions that permit high-emission fossil-fuel export
projects were unconstitutional, and a declaration that Canada is unable to meet its international global
warming obligations—in particular, those under the Paris Agreement.91 The plaintiffs also asked the
court to require the defendant to establish an ongoing independent accounting of Canada’s cumulative
GHG emissions.92
In Lho’imggin the government’s motion to strike was granted by the court but on the basis that section
91 of the Constitution Act, 186793 does not impose a duty on Canada to enact legislation, and that it
exceeds the jurisdiction of the court to require the government to do so.94 In addition, the claims made
under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter were deemed too broad and therefore not justiciable.95 The
requirement of provincial co-operation in such a systemic issue also exceeded the jurisdiction of the
court, and it was held that it would not be ‘an economical and efficient investment of judicial resources’
that would have a real effect on climate change’.96 The Court stated that the issue of climate change,
while undoubtedly important, lays in the realm of the executive and legislative branches of
government, not the judicial branches.97 The outcomes in this and the La Rose case mimic the approach
taken by the United States Ninth Circuit in the Juliana case, which was based on equal protection
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution. In a 2:1 decision, the majority
found the plaintiffs failed to prove standing. The court in Juliana found that the redress requested by
the plaintiffs was beyond the jurisdiction and capacity of the courts to implement – it was too broad
and required legislative action. In her dissenting opinion in the Juliana case, Judge Stanton critiqued
this judicial reticence, accusing her fellow judges of ‘throwing up their hands’ and abdicating
responsibility to act in the midst of the climate crisis.98
3.1 Successes and challenges in substantive human rights based arguments
Litigation, including class action suits, can play an important role in the face of regulatory blockages,
as litigation can be a method of structurally ‘going around’ partisan political debates.99 This could be
the case in Canada, where existing legislative efforts fall below what is expected of countries under the
Paris Agreement and demanded by successive scientific reports.100 Climate litigation, often brought by
youth plaintiffs, may be directed at governments to pressure them into taking their mitigation
Lho’immggin et al. (n 86) [11].
ibid [10].
90 ibid [13].
91 ibid [7].
92 ibid [8].
93 This Constitutional provision is often referred to as the POGG power, authorizing the Government to ‘make laws for
the peace, order, and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by
this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces’.
94 Lho’immggin et al. (n 86) [36].
95 ibid [56, 62].
96 ibid [74].
97 ibid [77]. The plaintiffs have appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Appeal and a hearing is expected in the fall.
98 Juliana (n 32), 33.
99 HM Osofsky and J Peel, ‘Energy Partisanship’ [2017] 65 Emory LJ 695, 702, 761, 764.
100 IPCC (n 53).
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commitments seriously. There have been several examples of youth-led climate litigation around the
world, with the Juliana v United States case attracting much attention in recent years.101 Cases in the
global South, brought by youth plaintiffs, have also gained traction.102 This youth-led litigation trend
has begun in earnest in Canada. The majority of Charter-based claims involve youth plaintiffs, as well
as many members of Indigenous communities. The importance of Indigenous roles in climate
litigation was highlighted in Part 2 above, and appears to be an evolving trend in Charter-based claims
in Canada. However, despite very similarly situated plaintiffs, not all cases in Canada have been
successful, at least on their initial applications.
The cases reviewed above all rely on substantive rights as articulated in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. Most of them involve climate-vulnerable constituents trying to protect their right to a
safe climate, predominantly youth and/or Indigenous plaintiffs. While it is too early to determine
whether these claims will be successful, as some of these cases are still pending, most of these cases
have failed due to judicial reluctance to engage with the question of climate change and human-rights
related climate harms.
The judicial reticence in Canadian climate litigation evident in the historical cases concerning the Kyoto
Protocol has reappeared in these cases. This explains the judicial preference to dismiss most of the
Charter-based cases summarized in Part 3 above on the basis of lack of justiciability. But it is not all
doom and gloom for climate-related human rights claims. Canadian courts have also consistently
stated that the Charter should be approached as a living tree, with broad and progressive judicial
interpretations being favoured to ensure the Charter keeps pace with changing social norms.103 Charterbased claims thus also benefit from a presumption of justiciability, and this presumption should be
empahsized by plaintiffs going forward in any appeals. In addition, a recent Supreme Court case in
2020 evidences a progressive judicial interpretation of Section 15(1), taking a more expansive approach
to equality rights,104and this more progressive approach could also be useful for plaintiffs to leverage
in Charter based cases going forward.
The key difference between the La Rose and Mathur cases appears to be the way the claim was framed.
Plaintiffs in La Rose brought objections to governmental conduct and inadequate GHG reduction
targets writ large, whereas plaintiffs in Mathur tied the inadequate GHG reductions targets to specific
Ontario legislation and highlighted regulatory inadequacies in provincial legislation that frustrate the
This case was a class action suit launched by young people in the US District Court for the District Court of Oregon,
claiming that the actions of the federal government that caused climate change, as well as the government’s inaction to
prevent it, had violated the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by denying protection provided to previous
generations. Juliana v United States 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233–34 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th
Cir. Jan. 17, 2020). The procedural elements of the case are complex, but in January 2020, the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 to
dismiss the lawsuit in Juliana 947 F.3d at 175, on the basis of lack of standing based on the inability of the court to
provide redress. Judge Josephine Staton’s dissent in the case, however, is notable. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175–91
(Staton, J. dissenting).
102 For example, in Future Generations v Ministry of the Environment and Others (2018), the Colombian Court also focused on
the issue of human rights: PAA Alvarado and D Rivas-Ramírez, ‘A Milestone in Environmental and Future Generations’
Rights Protection: Recent Legal Developments before the Colombian Supreme Court’ (2018) 30(3) Journal of
Environmental Law 519; J Setzer and L Benjamin, ‘Climate Litigation in the Global South: Constraints and Innovations’
(2019) Transnational Environmental Law 1.
103 Reference Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486.
104 Fraser v Canada [2020] SCC 28. See also N Chalifour, J Earle and L Macintyre, (2021) 17(1) ‘Coming of Age in a
Warming World: The Charter’s Section 15(1) Equality Guarantee and Youth-led Climate Litigation’ Journal of Law and
Equality 1.
101
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ability to meet national and international climate commitments.105 Narrower claims may end up being
a more successful approach for plaintiffs in these climate cases, making it easier for courts to avoid
the non-justiciability route that broader claims seem to invite.
While the arguments put forward by plaintiffs in these two cases were both under section 7 and 15 of
the Charter, the outcomes were different. Feasby et al. argue that the difference in the pleadings are a
distinction without a difference, and in fact it was differing approaches of the courts to the character
of Charter rights that explains the different outcomes.106 Ontario Judge Brown in the Mathur case—
decided just days after the final order in La Rose—denied the government’s motion to dismiss, thus
allowing the plaintiff’s climate change case to move forward.107 This decision is based on a more
generous and open-ended interpretation of Charter rights, specifically a progressive interpretation of
the role of the court in enforcing them. The La Rose decision, on the other hand, takes a much
narrower approach to justiciability, and consequently the role of the courts in adjudicating climate
change.108
There are similarities between the Lho’imggin outcome and the Canadian courts’ tendency to invoke
non-justiciability, deferring to legislators for the remedy sought by plaintiffs. Subsequently the
plaintiffs in Juliana have amended their claim to request a declaratory remedy by the court, and
plaintiffs in Canada should take note of this tactic. As discussed, two Canadian cases have already
failed on issues of justiciability and the related question of whether courts are able to grant an
appropriate remedy. A request for a declaratory judgment by the court that existing national climate
action is insufficient may be a more successful tactic. Canadian courts might be more prepared to take
a progressive interpretation of these Charter claims if the remedy requested is limited. Upon issuing
declaratory judgments, Canadian courts could then leave it to legislators and politicians to determine
the appropriate manner in which the State should meet its Charter obligations.109 This was the approach
taken recently by the Canadian Supreme Court in Fraser v Canada,110 and would therefore not be a
novel approach for the court to take. There are, in fact, many scientific and policy tools that courts
may look to in order to articulate a just and proportionate legal standard for Canada in these cases. To
begin with, Canada’s NDC, submitted under the Paris Agreement, anticipates a 30% reduction against
2005 levels by 2030, recently enhanced to a 40-45% reduction.111 Revised and upgraded NDCs were
expected to be submitted in 2021 in preparation for the next Conference of the Parties at the end of
2021 under the Paris Agreement. At the time of writing, a number of developed and developing countries
have already agreed to net-zero emission targets by 2050, and this target will be reflected in their
upgraded NDCs. Collective ambition is designed, under the Paris Agreement, to keep global temperature
increases to a temperature threshold,112 and the international climate agreement urges governments to

N Chalifour, J Earle and L MacIntyre, ‘Detrimental Deference’ The Canadian Bar Association National Magazine, 18
November 2020, <https://www.nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/law/opinion/2020/detrimental-deference>.
106 Feasby et al. (n 61), 246.
107 Mathur, et al. (n 80) [268].
108 Feasby et al. (n 61), 243.
109 Chalifour et al. (n 104), 6.
110 Fraser v Canada (n 104).
111 Press Release, ‘Prime Minister Trudeau announces increased climate ambition’ (22 April 2021),
<https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2021/04/22/prime-minister-trudeau-announces-increased-climateambition> accessed 24 June 2021.
112 The Paris Agreement (n 24).
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work backwards from those temperature goals, using precise metrics,113 to create national plans. These
plans should be continuously upgraded to ensure they meet best available scientific targets, taking into
account the needs of particularly vulnerable populations. Canada’s new 2021 NDC (referenced in Part
2) incorporates similar policy objectives. Canada and Canadian courts could follow suit, to develop an
enforceable Climate Recovery Plan by legislators, which is consistent with upgraded NDCs, and
therefore protective of Charter rights and compliant with any declaratory judgment issued by Courts.
In this vein, Chalifour and Earle note that Canadian courts could take a normative, purposive
approach to sections 7 and 15 rights under the Charter.114 Collins and Sossin note that Section 7 could
be broadly interpreted to set standards that protect public health, and section 15(1) could require that
these standards are responsive to the needs of vulnerable populations.115 These are exercises that
courts in other jurisdictions can, and have, undertaken. Courts in The Netherlands, and the French
Administrative Court in Paris,116 have conducted similar exercises regarding state emissions targets in
the context of the long-term temperature goals in the Paris Agreement. While not directly effective in
Canada, the European Convention on Human Rights, and therefore the Urgenda case that revolved around
Convention rights, could be persuasive in Canada.117 Other courts have also taken an oversight role in
relation to domestic climate plans. For example, in the Leghari v Federation of Pakistan case in Pakistan,118
Judge Syad Mansoor Ali Shah provided an extensive decision in 2015 based on Articles 9 and 11 of
the Pakistani Constitution (protecting the rights to life, human dignity, property and information
access), combined with international environmental law principles. He determined that together, these
provisions provided a sufficient judicial toolkit for him to make a positive decision on the impacts of
climate change.119 His orders enforced existing laws and oversaw work by the Climate Change
Commission, which led to increased and improved national targets.120
4. PROCEDURAL ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS
Environmental human rights are well recognized in both international environmental and human
rights law, and expansively elaborated in the 2018 Framework Principles on Human Rights and the
Environment proposed by the former Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.121 Procedural
environmental human rights, following Framework Principles, include rights to access information, prior
assessment of proposed policies and projects, freedom of association, freedom of expression and
peaceful assembly, public participation in environmental decision-making, and access to justice and

See eg J Rogelj and others, ‘Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5ºC in the Context of Sustainable Development’
in Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. (eds), Global warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the
threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (IPCC 2018).
114 Chalifour and Earle (n 18), 695.
115 L Collins and L Sossin, (2019) 52(1) ‘Approach to Constitutional Principles and Environmental Discretion in Canada’
UBC L Rev 293, 308.
116 J Lo, ‘Court Condemns French Government over Climate Inaction with Symbolic €1 Fine’ (Climate Home News, 3
February 2021) <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2021/02/03/court-condemns-french-government-climateinaction-symbolic-e1-fine/> accessed 24 June 2021.
117 Lantz (n 59), 159; Feasby et al. (n 61), 217.
118 Lahore High Court P. No 25501/2015.
119 J Setzer and L Benjamin, ‘Climate Change Litigation in the Global South: Filling in Gaps’ (2020) AJIL 59.
120 ibid.
121 Framework Principles (n3)
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effective remedies.122 Moreover, the Framework Principles state that in order to ensure the exercise of
these rights, a ‘safe and enabling environment’ should exist for ‘individuals, groups and organs of
society’ dedicated to environmental human rights issues to ‘operate free from threats, harassment,
intimidation, and violence’.123 These protections apply to Indigenous peoples,124 and additionally
before approving measures that might affect the lands, resources or territories of Indigenous peoples,
states are obligated to seek their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).125 While the Special
Rapporteur acknowledged in his introduction to the Framework Principles that ‘not all States have
formally accepted all of these norms’, he nevertheless recommended that ‘States should accept the
framework principles as actual or emerging international human rights law’ that ‘at a minimum’
represents best practices.126
Unlike many nations, Canada has chosen not to become a party to a procedural environmental rights
treaty such as the Aarhus Convention.127 While Canada now endorses the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),128 governments and courts in Canada have also been slow to fully
implement the rights of Indigenous peoples even where historic treaties are in place.129 However,
legislation specifically designed to implement UNDRIP has been passed in at least one province and
new federal legislation implementing UNDRIP in response to the TRC Calls for Action came into
force in June 2021.130 It remains to be seen what difference these legislative initiatives might make for
the protection of Indigenous rights in Canada. However, it is clear is that the exercise of procedural
environmental human rights by environmental human rights defenders, including Indigenous peoples,
plays an important role in pushing governments and businesses to take responsible climate action. For
this reason Canadian cases that raise procedural rights issues also mention attention in any analysis of
rights-based climate litigation.
In 2018, the newly elected Ontario government’s first action was to enact the Cancelling Regulation,131
which rendered inoperable the cap-and-trade program developed and implemented by the previous
provincial government, and even made it an offence subject to imprisonment to engage in transactions
under the old program.132 However Ontario, unlike many provinces, has a long-standing Environmental
Bill of Rights (EBR),133 which mandates public consultation over governmental environmental action
ibid, Framework Principles 5, 7, 8, 9, 10.
ibid, Framework Principles 4. The importance of non-discrimination (Principle 3), attention to vulnerability (Principle
14) and the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Principle 15) are cross-cutting concerns.
124 Ibid, Framework Principle 4 at para 10;
125 Ibid, Framework Principles 15, especially at paras 51-52.
126 ibid A/HRC/37/59 at p3 [8-9].
127 Government of Canada, ‘Convention on Access to Information: Public participation in the Aarhus Convention and
the Kiev Protocol’ < https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/internationalaffairs/partnerships-organizations/convention-access-information-public-participation-aarhus-convention-kievprotocol.html>. The more recent Latin American Escazu Agreement is limited to members of the region.
128 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution adopted by the General
Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295.
129 See generally J Borrows and Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties
(University of Toronto Press, 2017). On FPIC and extractive companies, see S Imai, ‘Consult, Consent, and Veto:
International Norms and Canadian Treaties’ in John Borrows and Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining
the Implementation of Historical Treaties (University of Toronto Press, 2017 370-408.
130 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, SBC 201, c 44; Bill C-15 An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl, 2021, cl 4(a)(b) (assented to 21 June 2021).
131 Prohibition Against the Purchase, Sale, and Other Dealings with the Emission Allowance and Credits Regulation, O Reg 386/18.
132 Greenpeace Canada v Minister of the Environment (Ontario) 2019 ONSC 5629, paras 9–10.
133 Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993, SO 1993, c 28.
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including regulation-making, and specifically mandates the posting of notice of government decisions,
the invitation of public comments, that the government consider a public comments received, and
that the government advises the public on how the public comments affected its decision.134 Despite
the new Ontario government’s attempt to get around this legislated consultation requirement by
posting an exemption notice, Greenpeace successfully argued that the cancellation of the cap-andtrade program regulations was unlawful unless there was compliance with the EBR. However, because
the government had complied with these procedural requirements and lawfully repealed the cap-andtrade regulations by the time the case was heard in court, the majority found the application for a
declaration to this effect would serve no purpose and was moot.135
Subsequently, in 2019, the Ontario government enacted the Federal Carbon Tax Transparency Act,136
which mandated (subject to penalty) that a sticker be visibly placed on every gas pump in Ontario
criticizing the federal government’s Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act,137 that stated in part ‘The federal
carbon tax will cost you.’138 The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) successfully challenged
this misleading sticker requirement as compelled speech in violation of section 2(b) of the Charter that
could not be justified under section 1.139 Interestingly, the CCLA was granted standing in part because
retailors were reluctant to appear in the case.140 This reluctance existed despite the fact that business
groups including a petroleum marketers association had expressed concern that the combination of a
penalty with the political nature of the speech amounted to a rights violation that would be particularly
detrimental to small business owners.141 From the perspective of the 2018 Framework Principles, this
case may be seen as not only raising a violation of freedom of expression (Principle 5), but also a
breach of state obligations to provide public education and awareness of environmental matters
(Principle 6) and to provide access to environmental information (Principle 7). State obligations to
guarantee access to environmental information extend to information about the ‘causes and
consequences of the global climate crisis’.142 According to the Office of the High Commissioner of
Human Rights (OHCHR) businesses also have a responsibility to ‘refrain from supporting
information campaigns that are based on inaccurate, misleading and unfounded assertions’ about
climate change.143 Yet on the facts here, compliance with that business human rights responsibility
would have put businesses in violation of domestic Canadian law.

Ibid, ss 15, 27, 35, 36(4); Greenpeace Canada (n 86), para 11.
Greenpeace Canada (n 131), paras 73, 82, 87–88, 111. The repeal of the legislation was an election promise.
136 Federal Carbon Tax Transparency Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 7.
137 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12.
138 Corporation of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Ontario (Attorney General) 2020 ONSC 4838, [1–4].
139 ibid [41–80]. Sections 2 and 1 of the Charter (n2) read as follows:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.
1 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
140 ibid [37-39].
141 ibid [33-34].
142 Safe Climate (n6) at para 64; Key Messages on Climate and Business (n10) at 7 (measure 02).
143 Key Messages on Climate and Business (n10) at 7 (measure 03). However the Key Messages do not appear to
contemplate a situation where it is the state that is mandating businesses to provide misinformation to the public.
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The current Alberta government has also been particularly hostile to environmentalists, supporting a
‘public inquiry’ into foreign funding of environmentalists, and spending millions on a ‘war room’
designed to counter its belief that US-based groups are behind Alberta’s oil and gas woes (despite no
evidence that this is the case).144 These initiatives have been described by prominent Canadian
environmentalist David Suzuki as ‘designed to silence or stigmatize those who raise legitimate
questions about an expanding fossil-fuel industry during a climate crisis.’145 The public inquiry was
unsuccessfully challenged by Ecojustice, a Canadian environmental law NGO, which had argued in
court that the inquiry was unlawful and biased.146 From the perspective of the 2018 Framework Principles,
this example raises concerns over state obligations to provide a ‘safe and enabling environment’ for
environmental human rights defenders to operate, ‘free from threats, harassment, intimidation and
violence’ (Principle 4).
The Alberta government’s hostility to environmentalists is in response to a long history of activist
opposition to fossil fuel development and to pipelines designed to transport oil and gas from Alberta’s
oil sands to downstream refineries and users. This opposition has sometimes taken the form of legal
action seeking judicial review of a government decision to approve a pipeline or a new oil and gas
project, often due to a failure to adequately integrate consideration of GHG emissions into
environmental assessment processes.147 Such judicial review cases are an example of the exercise of
rights of public participation and access to justice in environmental decision-making (Framework
Principles 9 and 10). These cases also reveal the challenges that arise in overcoming limitations in
environmental legislation that does not adequately incorporate consideration of climate change in
assessment and approval processes. Indeed, the failure of federal and provincial regulatory processes
to address both climate change and Indigenous rights issues led to the withdrawal in 2020 of the
Frontier Oil Sands project by the company CEO, before the environmental assessment process could
be completed.148
Indigenous-led opposition to Canadian fossil fuel projects could be understood as a form of human
rights-based climate litigation, although the express purpose of such litigation is not primarily to
address climate change, but rather to assert Indigenous self-determination. Some of these cases, such
as Tseil-Waututh Nation v Attorney General of Canada, challenging the Trans Mountain pipeline, elaborate
D Suzuki, ‘Alberta’s ‘war room’ is an attack on democracy’ (The Georgia Straight, 11 February 2020)
<https://www.straight.com/news/1359006/david-suzuki-albertas-war-room-attack-democracy> accessed 22 June 2021.
See further N Kusnetz, ‘In Attacks on Environmental Advocates in Canada, a Disturbing Echo of Extremist Politics in
the US’ (Inside Climate News, 24 February 2021) <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/24022021/tar-sands-albertakeystone-canada-climate-denial/>.
145 ibid Suzuki.
146 Ecojustice Canada Society v Alberta, 2021 ABQB 397. See also earlier decision denying Ecojustice’s application for
an injunction to stay to Public Inquiry proceedings, Ecojustice Canada Society v Alberta, 2020 ABQB 736.
147 NJ Chalifour, ‘Case Comment: A (Pre)Cautionary Tale about the Kearl Oil Sands Decision’ (2009) 5(2) McGill
Journal of Sustainable Development Law 251, 2009 CanLIIDocs 40, <http://www.canlii.org/t/284f>.
148 See letter from Don Lindsay to Minister Wilkinson (February 23, 202): https://www.teck.com/media/Don-Lindsayletter-to-Minister-Wilkinson.pdf (stating in part: ‘global capital markets are changing rapidly and investors and customers
are increasingly looking for jurisdictions to have a framework in place that reconciles resource development and climate
change, in order to produce the cleanest possible products. This does not yet exist here today and, unfortunately, the
growing debate around this issue has placed Frontier and our company squarely at the nexus of much broader issues that
need to be resolved. In that context, it is now evident that there is no constructive path forward for the project.
Questions about the societal implications of energy development, climate change and Indigenous rights are critically
important ones for Canada, its provinces and Indigenous governments to work through.’ See further IAAC https://iaacaeic.gc.ca/050/evaluations/proj/65505
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the nature of the government duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous peoples under Canadian
constitutional law and the implications for government of failing to meet the duty.149 Yet, once a court
has concluded that the duty is met, as was the case in Tseil-Waututh upon appeal, and government
approval for the pipeline has been issued,150 climate activists including Indigenous Peoples have few
options legal options. They might choose to engage in peaceful protest and risk being subject to an
injunction and arrest,151 or bring human rights-based claims such as in Lho’imggin, as discussed above,
which included among its arguments that current environmental assessment laws are inadequate.152
Recent Canadian Indigenous rights jurisprudence has taken an important step forward in recognizing
that the cumulative impacts of resource development can have such significant adverse impacts as to
amount to a breach of a treaty.153 In the case of Yahey v British Columbia the Blueberry River First
Nation alleged that (in the words of Justice Burke):
the cumulative effects from a range of provincially authorized activities, projects and
developments (associated with oil and gas, forestry, mining, hydroelectric infrastructure,
agricultural clearing and other activities) within and adjacent to their traditional territory [ ] has
resulted in significant adverse impacts on the meaningful exercise of their treaty rights, and
that amount to a breach of the Treaty.
In finding in favour of the First Nation, Justice Burke concluded in part:
the extent of the lands taken up by the Province for industrial development (including the
associated disturbances, impacts on wildlife, and impacts on Blueberry’s way of life), means
there are no longer sufficient and appropriate lands in Blueberry’s territory to allow for the
meaningful exercise by Blueberry of its treaty rights. The cumulative effects of industrial
development authorized by the Province have significantly diminished the ability of
Blueberry members to exercise their rights to hunt, fish and trap in their territory as part of
their way of life and therefore constitute an infringement of their treaty rights. The Province
has not justified this infringement.154
This June 2021 decision has been described as dropping a ‘bombshell’ on the natural gas industry in
British Columbia.155 Yet, climate change was not among the cumulative impacts at issue in this
decision. Indeed, hydro-dam development, often touted as a green energy solution, was among the
Tsleil-Waututh Nation et al. v Attorney General of Canada et al. 2018 FCA 153.
Tsleil-Wuatuth Nation v Attorney General of Canada, et al. 2019 FCA 224, leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed with costs
5 March 2020 <https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-l-csc-a/en/item/18179/index.do>.
151 See A Brown and A Bracken, ‘NO SURRENDER: Police Defend a Gas Pipeline Over Indigenous Land Rights,
Protestors Shut Railways Across Canada’ (The Intercept, 23 February 2020) <https://theintercept.com/2020/02/23/wetsuwetenprotest-coastal-gaslink-pipeline/> accessed 24 June 2021.
152 Lho’imggin (n 86), paras 15(e), 54, 67–68.
153 Yahey v British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 1287 (at para 3 p8). The facts of this case concerned history Treaty 8. The BC
government has decided not to appeal the decision. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/treaty-8province-appeal-1.6121474
154 Ibid (at para 3 p10)
155 N Bennett, ‘Court drops bombshell on B.C. natural gas industry’ (Business Intelligence for B.C. (BIV), 30 June, 2021)
<https://biv.com/article/2021/06/court-drops-bombshell-bc-natural-gas-industry>; see further R Hamilton & N
Ettinger, ‘Blueberry River First Nation and the Piecemeal Infringement of Treaty 8’ (July 20, 2021), online: ABlawg,
http://ablawg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Blog_RH_NE_Blueberry_Treaty_Rights.pdf
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industrial activities found to infringe the Blueberry River First Nation’s treaty rights, as well as oil and
gas development. These concerns about the impacts of hydro projects on Indigenous rights are not
isolated, and are consistent with concerns raised by other Indigenous peoples across Canada who have
challenging approvals of hydro projects in court, and after unsuccessful court actions faced arrest and
jail for engaging in peaceful protest and blockades to prevent such projects.156 ]
Framework Principle 5 speaks of the importance of states respecting and protecting the exercise of
rights of peaceful assembly in relation to environmental matters.157 Non-Indigenous Canadian climate
activists protesting pipelines have also found themselves subject to contempt of court proceedings as
a result of direct action to block pipeline development in contempt of injunctions ordered to keep
them from disrupting pipeline development.158 For example, in Mivasair, peaceful protesters blocked
Trans Mountain Pipeline’s access to terminal areas in British Columbia, and were charged with
contempt of court for public disobedience because they continuing to block access to the terminal
despite the company’s successful application for an injunction preventing them from doing so.159 Two
of the protestors argued that they were entitled to a defence of necessity on the basis that the
construction of the pipeline could not be reconciled with Canada’s GHG reduction commitments. 160
Moreover, the protesters sought a declaration that section 7 of the Charter entitled them to a
fundamental right to a stable climate.161 Both arguments were unsuccessful. The first argument relating
to the necessity defence was unsuccessful despite the fact the necessity defence had been successful
made out in other countries, as the court found that on the facts the protestors had legal alternatives
such as an appeal.162 The second argument was unsuccessful due in part to the court’s conclusion that
there was ‘no clear and imminent peril’ to the Charter rights given the process of climate change
happens incrementally over many decades.163 However, it is possible that in future this second
argument might have more traction in light of the language used by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the carbon pricing litigation, together with the extreme heat dome of the summer of 2021. In 2019,
federal environmental assessment legislation was replaced by the Impact Assessment Act (IAA).164 The
new IAA now requires consideration of whether proposed projects ‘hinder or contribute to the
Government of Canada’s ability to meet its environmental obligations and its commitments in respect
of climate change.’165 However, a regional assessment of oil and gas exploration off the coast of
Newfoundland and Labrador under the new IAA suggests that there is much more work to be done
See for example the Muskrat Falls hydro project where protestors raised concerns of methylmercury contamination
of water and food sources. J Brake, ‘Land protectors face criminal charges for protecting water, food, culture’ (The
Independent, 18 March 2017) <https://theindependent.ca/news/land-protectors-face-criminal-charges-for-defendingwater-food-culture/> accessed 24 June 2021; Grand Riverkeeper, Labrador Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) 2012 FC 1520.
157 Framework Principles (n3) Principle 5see especially paragraph 13 of the commentary, stating in part that ‘blanket
restrictions on protests surrounding the operations of mining, forestry or other resource extraction companies are
unjustifiable’.
158 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC v Mivasair 2019 BCSC 50, affirmed by Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC v Mivasair 2020 BCCA.
However, Indigenous women have claimed they are more harshly targeted by police. See Justin Brake, ‘Women speak out
against criminalization of land defenders’ (Aug 3, 2018) APTN National News https://www.aptnnews.ca/nationalnews/women-speak-out-against-criminalization-of-land-defenders-water-protectors/
159 Mivasair ibid [6–7].
160 ibid [10–11].
161 ibid [32].
162 ibid [28–30, 53–61].
163 ibid [54-55]. Nevertheless, see [32–52] which consider the impact of climate change and the right to a safe climate.
164 SC 2019, c 28.
165 SC 2019, c 28, s 22. See further M Doelle, ‘Integating Climate Change Mitigation into the Impact Assessment Act’ in M
Doelle & A J Sinclair, eds, The Next Generation of Impact Assessment: A Critical Review of the Canadian Impact Assessment Act
(Irwin Law, 2021). See also chapters on regional and strategic assessment.
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to ensure climate concerns are satisfactorily incorporated into environmental assessment and approval
processes, and it this regional assessment is now currently undergoing judicial review.166 Plaintiffs in
this case argue the regional assessment failed to consider scientific reports on the impact of methane
leakage arising from oil and gas activities on cumulative effects and climate change,167 and failed to
assess the effect of the drilling on Canada’s ability to meet its climate change commitments. 168 At the
time of writing, a decision on the merits is pending. Framework Principle 8 calls for the prior
assessment of the environmental impacts of proposed projects, including ‘potential effects on the
enjoyment of human rights’.169 While the new IAA is an improvement over the previous version of
the Act, it still does not explicitly incorporate a human rights approach.170 This is not in accordance
with, Framework Principle 8 which endorses the business responsibility to respect human rights
(BHR), including in the conduct of human rights impact assessments by proponents as part of the
environmental assessment process.171 This should be informed by attention to the human rights
implications of climate change.172
4.1 Discussion
As explored in this Part, Canadian plaintiffs have sought to exercise a wide range of procedural
environmental human rights in order to push back against governments and government decisionmakers that are either hostile to climate action or reluctant to make decisions that would be contrary
to industrial development. While some of the most effective litigation and peaceful protest against
fossil fuel pipelines has been led by Indigenous peoples, these cases against fossil fuel pipelines have
often been motivated primarily by Indigenous rights to self-determination rather than the need to
combat climate change.173 Yet, even as some Indigenous communities have resisted these projects,
other Indigenous communities have been supportive of the same projects, in some cases even seeking
an equity ownership stake in pipelines.174 At the same time, Indigenous led groups such as Indigenous
Climate Action are actively supporting youth-led climate action in opposition to extractive industries175
Sierra Club et al., v Canada (AG), Minister of Environment and Climate Change 2020 FC 663 (application for interim order
denied; motion to dismiss also denied).
167 ibid, (Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff) <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2020/20200511_2020-FC-663_application.pdf>, [20].
168 ibid [18, 20].
169 Framework Principles (n3), Principle 8. This includes transboundary and cumulative effects. Commentary to Principle
8 at para 20.
170 A Majekolagbe, SL Seck and P Simons, ‘Human Rights and the Impact Assessment Act: Proponents and Consultants
as Duty Bearers’ in M Doelle and J Sinclair (eds), The Next Generation of Impact Assessment: A Critical Review of the Canadian
Impact Assessment Act (Irwin Law, 2021).
171 ibid; Framework Principles (n 81), Principle 8, Commentary [22]. See also Principle 12, Commentary [35].
172 On human rights due diligence, carbon majors, and climate change, see C Higham, Reimagining Responsibility: How
Human Rights Due Diligence Practices Could Inform Judicial Responses to Climate Accountability Litigation (LLM thesis, UBC, 2018).
173 On potential of Indigenous led climate litigation see https://www.mcgill.ca/mjsdl/files/mjsdl/tyler-paquetteimagined-body.pdf (and sources cited in this paper)
174 K Balx, ‘Plans to sell Trans Mountain pipeline to Indigenous groups take another step forward’ CBC News (19
February 2021) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/bakx-tmx-pipeline-negotiations-1.5918712> accessed 24 June
2021 (noting that the Federal Court had found that of the 129 Indigenous communities potentially affected by the
pipeline project, 120 either support it or do not oppose it). See also K Balx, ‘B.C. First Nation and partners propose new
$10B LNG megaproject’ CBC News (19 July 2021) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/bakx-ksi-lisims-lng1.6107901>.
175 Indigenous Climate Action, ‘Producing Resources and Tools: Indigenous Climate Action Youth Wellness Awards’
<https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/resources> accessed 22 August 2021 (the purpose of these is stated in part
as: ‘ICA is committed to lifting up young Indigenous Peoples who are doing the hard work of climate justice organizing
and engaging with frontlines that oppose extractive industries in order to protect our homelands / Mother Earth.’)
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and critiquing the federal government for failing to fully consult Indigenous peoples in the
development of climate policy.176 This suggests that there potential exists for future litigation on the
ground of failing to consult Indigenous peoples in the development of climate policy.
But this is not the whole story. A limitation of the survey of Canadian rights-based climate cases in
both Part 3 and 4 is that it does not capture those plaintiffs who choose not to bring court actions or
might be reluctance to engage the courts, nor does it capture those who might wish to exercise their
environmental human rights through taking direct action, yet are prevented from doing so because
they fear the consequences of arrest. This is a serious issue in Canada due to lack of access to justice
that are particularly evident in the environmental context. It is possible that Canada’s failure to become
a party to the Aarhus Convention together with its slow embrace of UNDRIP have contributed to these
failings.177 Another barrier to bringing litigation is that costs rules create uncertainty for plaintiffs who,
if they lose, may find themselves paying a portion of the legal costs of defendants. 178 The risk of
adverse cost orders have been identified frequently as a major deterrent for public interest
environmental litigation and for Indigenous plaintiffs.179 Even though protective costs orders are
available, they are rarely granted and the fact that plaintiffs must bring a motion to secure them creates
its own costs risks and disincentives.180 Securing class action certification of environmental actions
has also proven challenging in much of Canada.181 While Quebec has often been put forward as the
exception, the experience of ENvironment JEUnesse as discussed in Part 3 suggests that certification
may be even more challenging in the climate context.
One key theme that emerges from the procedural environmental human rights cases canvassed here
is that governments may not only be reluctant to embrace climate action, but may be so hostile to it
that they force businesses to engage in climate mis-information, or actively seek to undermine the
work of environmental organizations. Given this reality, an expansive understanding of environmental
human rights is necessary in order to present a full picture of the extent to which legal actions can
support climate action, and the extent to which barriers exist. When barriers to access justice are
sufficiently high, peaceful protest or direct action becomes a necessary step for those willing to take
this step. This points to the importance of acknowledging and challenging the criminalization of land
and water defenders, including Indigenous women,182 as well as understanding that the

E Deranger, ‘Climate Emergency & the Colonial Response’ Yellowhead Institute, 2 July 2021,
https://yellowheadinstitute.org/2021/07/02/climate-emergency-colonial-response/; See further Indigenous Climate
Action, ‘Decolonizing Climate Policy in Canada: Report from Phase I’ (March 2021).
177 S Robinson, ‘Procedural Environmental Rights in Canada and the Promising Possibilities of the Aarhus Convention’
(unpublished paper, March 2021, on file with author).
178 M Twigg, ‘Costs immunity: banishing the bane of costs from public interest litigation’ Dalhousie Law Journal (2013)
36(1): 193-238 at 205-207; M Molavi, ‘Law’s financialization: litigation finance and multilayer access to justice in Canada’
Canadian Journal of Law and Society (2018) 33(3): 425-445. See also Lockridge v Director, Minister of the Environment, 2012
ONSC 2316.
179 Canadian Environmental Law Association, Ecojustice, and Environmental Law Centre, ‘Costs and Access to Justice
in Public Interest Environmental Litigation: Submissions to the Federal Court of Appeal and Federal Court Rules
Committee’ (November 23, 2015).
180 Ibid at pp11-13.
181 M Molavi, ‘Access to justice and the limits of environmental class actions in Ontario’ Canadian Journal of Law and
Society (2020) 35(3): 391-412.
182 Anya Zoledziowski, ‘Governments That Are Occupying Land Are Criminalizing Indigenous Peoples for Occupying
Land’ (22 April 2021), Vice, https://www.vice.com/en/article/z3xeae/governments-that-are-occupying-land-arecriminalizing-indigenous-peoples-for-occupying-land) See further Yellowhead Institute.
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recommendations on extractive industries of the National Inquiry Into Missing and Murdered Women
and Girls are a crucial piece of the puzzle.183
5. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED
CLIMATE ACTIONS
A fulsome consideration of Canadian rights-based climate litigation must also contemplate the
potential of litigation to invoke the independent responsibility of business enterprises to respect
human rights in accordance with the 2011 UNGPs.184 However, to date, no human rights-based
climate litigation in Canada has been brought directly against corporate actors.185 Indeed, to date there
has been little if any discussion of the possibility that plaintiffs from outside of Canada might also
consider using Canadian courts to sue Canadian-based companies to seek to reduce their emissions,
or to recover the costs of climate harm. Yet it may be only a matter of time before such litigation
might be initiated. In addition, human rights claims against corporations by particularly vulnerable
communities within Canada are also a distinct possibility.186 Over twenty years ago, the first tort claim
brought in Canadian courts by foreign plaintiffs against a Canadian-based transnational corporation
raising allegations of environmental harms overseas was dismissed before the merits stage on the basis
of the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens.187 After many unsuccessful attempts,188 several
cases are proceeding and some have even settled, although many hurdles remain.189 Of particular
interest is the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Nevsun, which opens the door to the
possibility that claims against transnational corporations could be brought in Canadian courts alleging
violations of customary international law human rights norms.190 Might such a claim be framed against
a carbon-intensive fossil fuel company (or carbon major)?
If fully exploited, it has been alleged that the oil sands would exhaust 16% of the global carbon budget
to limit warming to 1.5°C.191 Many actors in the Canadian oil sands are or were multinational
companies. Up to 2017, companies such as ConocoPhilips, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP

National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report
of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, vol 1A (2019) at 584-94. The calls to justice
explicitly note the need to ensure the safety of Indigenous women and girls at all stages of extractive operations
including project planning and assessment. Ibid at 196 (‘Calls to Justice: Calls for Extractive and Development
Industries 13.1 – 13.5’. The report adopts an inclusive definition of women and girls encompassing the rights of
‘2SLGBTQQIA people’.
184 See OHCHR Key Messages on Climate Change and Business (n10); UNGPs; (n10) Safe Climate report (n6).
185 A possible exception in the Volkswagen class action (n 68 and accompanying text). See further NRCan, National
Issues Report 2021, https://changingclimate.ca/national-issues/ at Chapter 8.7 (climate litigation against the private
sector): https://changingclimate.ca/national-issues/chapter/8-0/ 8.6 and 8.7
186 See for example Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell [2021] C/09/571932 / HA ZA 19-379.
187 Recheches Internationales Québec v Cambior Inc [1998] QJ No 2553 (QL); SL Seck, ‘Environmental Harm in Developing
Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining Corporations: The Interface of Public and Private International
Law’ (1999) 37 Can YB Int'l Law 139.
188 See, for example, Yassin v Green Park International Inc 2010 QCCA 1455 (CanLII), leave to appeal to SCC dismissed
with costs, Bil'in (Village Council) v Green Park International Inc. 2011 CanLII 10843 (SCC), leave to appeal to SCC
dismissed with costs; Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining Corp 2010 ONSC 2421, aff’d 2011 ONCA 191.
189 Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc (2013), 116 OR (3d) 674 (Ont. SCJ); Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc. 2017 BCCA 39 (BC CA),
leave to appeal refused Tahoe Resources Inc. v Adolfo Agustin Garcia, et al. 2017 CarswellBC 1553 (SCC).
190 Nevsun (n 4).
191 Oil Change International, ‘Climate on the Line: Why New Tar Sands Pipelines Are Incompatible with Paris Goals’
(January 2017), 4.
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owned significant stakes in the area.192 Since 2017, a number of these MNEs have sold their stakes to
domestic companies, leaving over 70% of activity in the oil sands in the hands of Canadian companies
such as Canadian Natural Resources, Cenovus, Suncor Energy and Imperial Oil.193 An assessment of
the contribution of MNEs such as these was calculated by Richard Heede, who focused on the
historical emissions of the largest emitting companies and state-owned enterprises. Within Heede’s
top 20 emitters’ are a number of MNEs which have or had a stake in the Canadian oil sands.
Additionally, Canadian companies appear within Heede’s study in the list of 90 carbon majors,
including Encana at number 62, Suncor at number 67, Canadian Natural Resources at 76, and
Talisman at number 79.194 Many of these same companies have formed a net zero alliance, with
ambitions to achieve net zero emissions by 2050.195 It remains to be seen what concrete plans these
companies will adopt to achieve these ambitions, however, their stated commitments illustrate
growing investor pressure to present themselves as proactive on climate.
The role of transnational litigation is particularly relevant for multinational entities such as the carbon
majors, which have subsidiaries and/or operations in disparate jurisdictions around the world. MNEs
are sensitive to judicial decisions in various jurisdictions due to their global footprints. While litigation
against carbon majors has exploded in the United States and a few other jurisdictions, Canada has so
far seen no litigation initiated against carbon majors in Canadian courts. However, as both the impacts
of climate change and litigation amplify in the coming years, it is likely that Canada, and Canadian
carbon majors, will face suits. The approach of Canadian courts to the doctrine of forum non conveniens
has diverged from the approach taken by UK courts. Canadian courts have agreed to hear select
transnational corporate accountability cases alleging human rights violations that occurred in states
whose judicial systems offer no possibility of access to justice.196 Furthermore, recent Canadian
jurisprudence emerging from litigation over the enforcement of the foreign judgment in the litigation
known colloquially as Chevron-Ecuador, has confirmed that overcoming the doctrine of separate legal
personality may be challenging in Canadian courts.197 This is despite arguments from legal scholars
that overcoming this doctrine is essential for environmental and climate justice.198
Nevertheless, the 2020 Nevsun decision offers a potentially promising development for future climate
litigation, although the facts in that case raised issues of forced labour in Eritrea rather than
environmental or climate concerns.199 In Nevsun majority of the court held that corporations may be
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held liable if they have breached customary international law (CIL) norms, as international law have
evolved so that it is not plain and obvious that corporations enjoy a blanket exclusion under CIL from
direct liability for violations of ‘obligatory, definable, and universal norms of international law.’200
However, ultimately it is left to the trial judge to determine whether the ‘specific norms [of customary
international law] relied on’ ‘are of such character’ and, if so, ‘whether the common law should evolve
so as to extend the scope of these norms to bind corporations.’201 The majority noted that Canadian
laws do not conflict with the adoption of CIL norms as part of Canadian common law, and that
government policy including the establishment of the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible
Enterprise (CORE) is consistent with the expectation that Canadian-based transnational corporate
actors should respect human rights norms.202 While the CORE itself does not make reference to
climate change, it does endorse the responsible business conduct guidelines of the OECD, which do
consider climate change albeit incompletely.203
5.1 A future for corporate climate-based litigation in Canada?
While the discussion of corporate climate-based litigation is theoretical, for the moment, the Nevsun
case does open up significant possibilities for this type of litigation to emerge in Canada. Corporate
climate litigation is gaining traction in many jurisdictions around the world, particularly in the global
North.204 Moreover, the expectation that companies undertake human rights due diligence in
accordance with the UN Guiding Principles could inform future corporate climate litigation. This
expectations was evident in the recent Dutch case against Shell, which also referred briefly to the
environment chapter of the OECD MNE Guidelines.205 Although some may view it to be a significant
leap to apply CIL norms to a right to a safe climate, the urgency of the climate crisis appears to be
gaining traction in at least some courts, while legal experts have recently developed a definition of the
international crime of ecocide.206
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It remains to be seen whether Nevsun will inspire novel transnational or domestic human rights
corporate accountability litigation in Canadian courts, including human rights-based climate claims.
Given developments in other jurisdictions, and the extensive contributions of Canadian-based fossil
fuel companies to climate change, we would suggest there is room for either domestic or foreign
plaintiffs to explore the potential of Nevsun.
Tying Parts 3 and 4 together, we also consider the distinct possibility of claims by Indigenous litigants
not only against fossil fuel companies but also against the Government on procedural, rather than
Charter, grounds. As noted above, the duty to consult Indigenous communities is constitutionally
protected in Canada. Pacquette notes that this duty could be triggered not just by actions that increase
GHG emissions, but also from executive policies that increase GHG emissions. 207 This could
potentially include approval of new pipelines projects which are a major obstacle to the achievement
of climate targets in Canada.208 Government inaction, in particular the failure of the Government to
reduce or eliminate black carbon, has also been contemplated as the basis of human-rights based legal
arguments brought by Athabaskans against Canada.209 While these claims would not be direct litigation
against a private entity, they could significantly affect corporations by impacting the approval of fossil
fuel projects.
Alternatively, or in addition, several Canadian companies were mentioned in the petition to the
Philippines human rights commission. The investigation by the human rights commission concluded
that carbon majors companies could be found legally and morally liable for human rights violations
arising from climate change in certain circumstances. The investigation focused on circumstances
involving obstruction, deception, fraud, or where the relevant mens rea (criminal intent) may exist to
hold companies accountable under criminal as well as civil laws. While the investigation does have
some legal consequences, it serves largely as an expository exercise to highlight the damaging role
these carbon majors continue to play in the causing climate change, while also elevating the voices of
the climate vulnerable. A similar type of investigation could also be contemplated in Canada given the
vast role of private entities in the Canadian tar sands.

6. CONCLUSIONS
There is increasing evidence of litigation in Canadian courts at the intersection of climate change and
human rights. In this article we have provided an overview of claims that (at the time of writing) are
moving through Canadian courts, and also briefly considered the possibility of future transnational or
domestic corporate climate accountability cases. Canada is a high GHG emitting country, yet public
discourse around climate change routinely ignores the global climate justice implications of historic
and contemporary emissions that far exceed Canada’s fair share of the global carbon budget. The
country’s federal plan commits Canada to reaching net zero by 2050. This is a legislative step in the
right direction, but the road to achieving these targets is a difficult one, primarily due to the Canadian
economy’s heavy reliance on fossil fuels.210 It is therefore possible that the federal plan may reduce or
T Pacquette, ‘The Inhabitants of an Imagined Body: The Crown’s Duty to Consult and Accommodate Indigenous
Communities in the Artic Adversely Affected by Climate Change’ McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law
(2021) 15(2), 155.
208 Ibid, 159.
209 Szpak (n23).
210 L Hughes, ‘How Canada intends to achieve its 2030 targets’ Policy Options (19 July 2021)
https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2021/how-canada-intends-to-achieve-its-2030-emissions-targets.
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in fact increase the volume of climate litigation, particularly if Canada fails to meet its stated targets.
Such a failure to meet emission reduction targets would have dire consequences for climate vulnerable
constituents in the country, particularly Indigenous communities.
The cases assessed in this paper bring issues of climate justice to the fore, highlighting the vulnerable
position of youth and Indigenous populations on both substantive and procedural human rights
grounds. The outcomes of some of these Section 7 and 15(1) cases to date reinforce the traditional,
deferential approach of Canadian courts to legislators and reflect the heavy reliance of the country on
fossil fuels. The fact that Canada is so dependent upon oil sands development economically makes
Canada a difficult jurisdiction within which to bring climate-related claims. The national economic
dependence on oil and gas means climate change and so climate litigation is more closely connected
to economic and policy making. Climate related cases may be more likely to face judicial hesitancy to
intervene, as some courts may feel that decisions on climate change are more appropriately left to the
legislature and politicians as they involve national economic and political considerations concerning
energy access and independence. This trend has been confirmed in some of the cases to date. In
particular, the issue of justiciability has posed challenges for climate litigation, especially for Charterbased claims. Given the high dependence of the national economy on fossil fuels, it is possible that
courts will be tempted to leave balancing exercises around national policy making on climate change
to the legislature. This trend around justiciabilty has already been illustrated in the previous sections,
particularly around Charter-based claims, and plaintiffs should acknowledge and seek strategies to
combat this judicial tendency.
However, it is early days for rights-based climate litigation in Canada, and we argue that Charter claims
still hold potential for redressing the grievances of Canada’s climate vulnerable populations. Such
potential might be more likely to be realised where plaintiffs ask for less from the courts. In particular,
Charter-based claims appear more likely to be more successful when they are narrowly framed. Lessons
can also be learned from successes and failures from other jurisdictions, in particular the outcomes
and tactics used in the Urgenda and Juliana litigation. For example, the plaintiffs in the Mathur case have
the opportunity to reframe their claim in the wake of other national and progressive Charter-based
decisions, and they could choose to request a declaratory judgement from the court. This approach
might provide less opportunity for the Supreme Court to fall back on the old and familiar grounds of
non-justiciability to dismiss the case.
The analysis has also shown that it is important to pay attention to the procedural human rights
dimensions of climate litigation, as the ability to exercise rights to freedom of expression, protest,
participation in decision-making and ultimately access to justice in the case of environmental harm are
essential to ensure protection of substantive rights including the right to a safe climate. This is
particularly the case in Canada given the country continues to struggle to overcome colonial legacies,
and often fails to support environmental human rights defenders, including Indigenous communities
who oppose fossil fuel development or the imposition of green energy mega projects on their lands.
The discussion of such procedural environmental human rights cases concerned with Indigenous
rights to consultation and FPIC raises some unanswered questions about the sort of cases which fall
within the scope of what is considered to be ‘climate litigation’. Climate litigation databases often
leave out cases brought by Indigenous peoples seeking to exercise their rights to self-determination
and to protect local resources from industrial harm, whether perpetuated by fossil fuel projects or
hydro dams. Yet reconciliation with Indigenous peoples is a central pre-occupation in Canada that
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must be part of the overall assessment. Another finding that emerges from the analysis of the broader
legal context is the number of challenges facing public interest litigants and Indigenous peoples in
accessing justice through the courts. While the procedural environmental human rights cases
canvassed in Part 4 show evidence that some Canadians are attempting to exercise their rights in the
interests of a safe climate, concern over adverse costs awards may lead activists to pursue peaceful
protest rather than litigation, despite the risk of arrest. This insight that many activists might be
deterred from pursuing litigation due to various legal barriers may also dampen the optimism felt by
many climate lawyers about the potential of climate litigation to grow and secure change in Canada.
These questions merit further research, alongside further research about what ratification and
implementation of the Aarhus Convention could achieve.
Given that insurance companies are likely to increasingly withdraw from coverage of many climaterelated harms,211 and government disaster relief funds will be capped,212 it is to be expected that many
other potential climate plaintiffs will emerge from within Canada over time. Building on Indigenous
claims, we also expect to potentially see future claims based on the failure of the Crown to consult
climate-vulnerable communities. The conclusions of the Supreme Court from the Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act covered in Part 2 above around the disproportionate impacts of climate change in Canada should
be leveraged by plaintiffs in existing climate cases moving forward. Other causes of action could be
based on the failure of the Crown to consult vulnerable communities, and these could have significant
consequences for ongoing or future fossil-based projects, including by private industry. The heavy
dependence on the national economy on the tar sands also opens up potential new fronts of climate
litigation, particularly against carbon major corporations. Existing jurisprudence on corporate liability
suggests such a claim might find success. These industries are already under pressure by investors to
reduce emissions, and human rights based claims are likely to increase such pressure.
In addition, the implications of climate change for biodiversity in Canada will also be immense,
potentially opening the door to future claims on behalf of natural systems.213 Claims around the costs
and inevitability of adaptation measures are also likely to emerge.214 These are likely to include humanrights based arguments as they have in other jurisdictions, and so if they do arise, will form an
important plank in human rights-based climate litigation in Canada. This article has illustrated that the
potential for rights-based climate litigation in Canada is vast. While not prescriptive, this article
assumes that climate-based claims will increase significantly in Canada and could take a variety of legal
forms. Whether these claims will be successful remains to be seen, but the landscape is ripe.
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